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Abstract
Background: Public and private health sectors both play a crucial role in the health systems of low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs). The tuberculosis (TB) control strategy in India encourages the public sector to actively 
partner with private practitioners (PPs) to improve the quality of front line service delivery. However, ensuring 
effective and sustainable involvement of PPs constitutes a major challenge. This paper reports the findings from 
an empirical study focusing on the perspectives and experiences of PPs towards their involvement in TB control 
programme in India. 
Methods: The study was carried out between November 2010 and December 2011 in a district of a Southern Indian 
State and utilised qualitative methodologies, combining observations and in-depth interviews with 21 PPs from 
different medical systems. The collected data was coded and analysed using thematic analysis. 
Results: PPs perceived themselves to be crucial healthcare providers, with different roles within the public-private 
mix (PPM) TB policy. Despite this, PPs felt neglected and undervalued in the actual process of implementation of 
the PPM-TB policy. The entire process was considered to be government driven and their professional skills and 
knowledge of different medical systems remained unrecognised at the policy level, and weakened their relationship 
and bond with the policy and with the programme. PPs had contrasting perceptions about the different components 
of the TB programme that demonstrated the public sector’s dominance in the overall implementation of the DOTS 
strategy. Although PPs felt responsible for their TB patients, they found it difficult to perceive themselves as ‘partners 
with the TB programme.’ 
Conclusion: Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly utilized as a public health strategy to strengthen 
health systems. These policies will fail if the concerns of the PPs are neglected. To ensure their long-term involvement 
in the programme the abilities of PPs and the important perspectives from other Indian medical systems need to be 
recognised and supported.
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Implications for policy makers
• Public-private mix-tuberculosis (PPM-TB) policy has categorised all types of private practitioners (PPs) (irrespective of system of practice) under 
one broad group as ‘private providers.’ The policy document tends to see all practitioners through the same lens of financial incentives. The 
interactions with PPs, however, revealed that their motivation was not purely incentive-based; rather there was a variation across types of providers 
in terms of their need for incentives.
• Understanding the professional level of individual practitioners is crucial, and needs to be supported with an appropriate incentive structures in 
order for their long-term involvement in the programme to be ensured.
• PPM-TB policy has ignored the potential of alternative systems of medicine and the contribution they can bring to TB control efforts.
• PPM-TB policy’s lack of flexibility in allowing PPs to prescribe TB treatment on their own, or using their own system of medicine as a supportive 
treatment, affects PP involvement. 
• The untapped potential of different medical systems needs to be recognised, trusted and supported with suitable policy measures in the ‘post-2015 
TB strategy.’
Implications for the public
Public and private health sectors both play a crucial role in the health systems of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), and need continuous 
efforts to build effective partnerships for strengthening health systems. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) in India encourages 
PPPs, by developing national policies and guidelines for the engagement of all healthcare providers in different National Health Programmes. However, 
achieving a sustained partnership between the public and private health sectors, through sustaining interest, motivation and involvement of private 
practitioners (PPs) in disease programmes (both communicable and non-communicable), continues to be a major challenge for the concerned health 
authorities. This paper draws on the constraints and challenges faced by PPs in the implementation of the public-private mix-tuberculosis (PPM-TB) 
policy in India.
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Politics and Power in Global Health: The Constituting Role 
of Conflicts
Comment on “Navigating Between Stealth A vocacy and Uncons ious Dogmatism: The 
Challenge of Researching the Norms, Politics and Power of Global Health”
Clemet Askheim, Kristin Heggen, Eivind Engebretsen*
Abstract
In a recent article, Gorik Ooms has drawn attention to the normative underpinnings of the politics of 
global health. We claim that Ooms is indirectly submitting to a liberal conception of politics by framing 
the politics of global health as a question of individual morality. Drawing on the theoretical works of 
Chantal Mouffe, we introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to Ooms’ conception. 
Using controversies surrounding medical treatment of AIDS patients in developing countries as a case we 
underline the opportunity for political changes, through political articulation of an issue, and collective 
mobilization based on such an articulation.
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among gl bal health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We commend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
global health and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“th  role of polit cs and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven b  crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conf icts a d reduces it to either a rationalistic, eco omic
calc lat on, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested t  become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be abl  to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
w rld in  conflictual anner “with opposed cam s with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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 a rece t c tri ti  t  t e g i g e ate a t t e 
r le f er i  gl al ealt , rik s e asizes 
t e r ative er i i gs f gl al ealt  litics. 
e i e tifies t ree relate  r le s: (1) a lack f agree e t 
a g glo al ealt  sc lars a t t eir r ative re ises, 
(2) a lack f agree e t et ee  gl al ealt  sc lars a  
licy- akers regar i g t e r ative re ises erlyi g 
licy, a  (3) a lack f illi g ess a g sc lars t  
clearly state t eir r ative re ises a  ass ti s. is 
c f si  is f r s e f t e ex la ati s “ y gl al 
ealt ’s licy- akers are t i le e ti g t e k le ge 
ge e ate  y gl al ealt ’s e irical sc lars.” e calls 
f r greater ity et ee  sc lars a  et ee  sc lars 
a  licy- akers, c cer i g t e erlyi g r ative 
re ises a  greater e ess e  it c es t  a v cacy.1
e c e  t e eff rt t  rei state er a  litics i  
gl al ealt  a  agree t at “a rely e irical evi e ce- ase  
a r ac  is a ficti ,” a  t at s c  a vie  risks c veri g  
“t e r le f litics a  er.” t y c trasti g t is ficti  
it  gl al ealt  researc  “ rive   crises, t iss es, a  
t e c cer s f rga ize  i terest gr s,” as a “ at  e are 
tryi g t  ve a ay fr ,” s is s itti g t  a li eral 
c ce ti  f litics e i licitly criticizes t e tc es 
f.1  li eral vie  f litics eva es t e c stit ti g r le f 
c flicts an  re ces it t  eit er a rati alistic, ec n ic 
calc lati , r a  i ivi al esti  f ral r s. is 
is ec e  i  s e  e tates t at “it is t ssi le t  
isc s  t e litics f gl al ealt  it t isc ssi g t e 
r ative re ises e i  t e litics.”1 t at if e 
take t e litical as t e ri ary level a  t e r ative as 
sec ary, r erive  fr  t e litical?
at is at e ill try t   ere, y i tr ci g a  
alter ative c ce t alizati  f t e litical a  e ce free 
s fr  t e “false ile a” s als  a ts  esca e. 
“ lt g  c str ctivists ave e asize   erlyi g 
r ative str ct res c stit te act rs’ i e tities a  
i terests, t ey ave rarely treate  t ese r ative str ct res 
t e selves as efi e  a  i f se  y er, r e asize  
 c stit tive effects als  are ex ressi s f er.”2 is 
is t e starti g i t f r t e litical t e rist a tal ffe, 
a  e  res se is t  evel  a  t l gical c ti  f 
t e litical, ere “t e litical el gs t  r t l gical 
c iti .”3 cc r i g t  ffe, s ciety is i stit te  
t r g  c flict. “[ ]y ‘t e litical’ I ea  t e i e si  f 
a tag is  ic  I take t  e c stit tive f a  s cieties, 
ile y ‘ litics’ I ea  t e set f ractices a  i stit ti s 
t r g  ic  a  r er is create , rga izi g a  
c existe ce i  t e c text f c flict ality r vi e  y t e 
litical.”3  iss e r a t ic ee s t  e c teste  t  ec e 
litical, a  s c  a c testati  c cer s lic acti  a  
creates a ‘ e’ a  ‘t ey’ f r  f c llective i e tificati . t 
t e fixati  f s cial relati s is artial a  recari s, si ce 
a tag is  is a  ever rese t ssi ility.  liticize a  iss e 
a  e a le t  ilize s rt, e ee s t  re rese t t e 
rl  i   c flict al a er “ it  se  ca s it  
ic e le ca  i e tify.”3 
s ses t e case f “i reasi g i ter ati al ai  s e i g 
 I S treat e t” t  ill strate is i t.1 e fra es t e 
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Background 
Public and private health sectors both play a crucial role in 
the health systems of low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs).1-3 The terms public sector and private sector can 
be defined in several different ways.4 In general, “the ‘public 
sector’ includes organizations or institutions that are funded 
by state revenue and that function under government 
budgets.”5 In contrast, the ‘private sector’ comprises those 
organizations and individuals that are privately owned and 
operate outside of government authority.6 Over the last two 
decades, researchers focusing on health systems and health 
policy issues have emphasised the untapped potential of 
the private medical sector in LMICs.7-11 In 2010, the 63rd 
World Health Assembly passed a resolution to strengthen the 
capacity of governments to constructively engage the private 
sector to provide essential healthcare services.12 Efforts to 
involve private players reflect the larger movements in public 
health towards strengthening health systems. 
In India, the health system is broadly divided across the 
public and the private sectors. As enshrined in the Indian 
constitution, healthcare delivery is largely the responsibility 
of the provincial states and territories, rather than the federal 
government. Running in parallel with the public health sector, 
India has one of the most highly privatized healthcare systems 
in the world, and this system fills the gaps in the public health 
system. According to the National Family Health Survey-3, 
the private medical sector remains the primary source of 
healthcare for 70% of households in urban areas and 63% 
of households in rural areas.13 The private healthcare sector 
is highly diverse, ranging from: practitioners of Western 
medicine (MBBS doctors); those trained in Indian systems 
of medicine often termed as ‘AYUSH’ (an acronym for 
Ayurveda, Yoga, Unani, Siddha, and Homeopathy); and those 
without formal trainings. According to the Central Bureau 
of Health Intelligence, in 2012 there were 883 812 qualified 
allopathic doctors, and 628 634 AYUSH doctors registered.14 
Public health researchers writing on universal health 
coverage (UHC), have emphasised ‘quality improvement 
and reduction of out-of-pocket expenditure on healthcare 
through a well-regulated integration of the private sector 
within the national healthcare system.’15 It is clear that both 
sectors have their strengths and weaknesses and that neither 
can replace the other, nor can they alone achieve the best 
results for the health system.5 The Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare (MoHFW) has adopted the strategy of public-
private partnership (PPP) as an attempt to strengthen the 
health systems, by developing national policies and guidelines 
to emphasise the engagement of all healthcare providers in 
different National Health Programmes. 
The vision of the Government of India for tuberculosis (TB) 
control is a “TB-free India” with a reduction in the burden 
of the disease until it is no longer a major public health 
problem.16 To achieve this vision, the Revised National TB 
Control Programme (RNTCP) has adopted a new objective to 
achieve ‘universal access’ to quality diagnosis and treatment 
for all TB patients in the community.17 One of the key pillars 
towards achieving universal access is to ‘expand efforts to 
engage all care providers.’16 The World Health Organization’s 
(WHO’s) ‘post-2015 TB strategy’ strongly emphasises private 
sector involvement for achieving universal coverage.18
Irrespective of these international and national attempts 
around partnerships, achieving sustained partnership between 
the public and private health sectors, through sustaining 
interest, motivation and involvement of private practitioners 
(PPs) in disease programmes (both communicable and 
non-communicable), continues to be a major challenge for 
the concerned health authorities.5,19,20 This paper provides 
insights into how to sustain the involvement of PPs in disease 
control programmes by focusing on their perspectives and 
experiences around the implementation of the public-private 
mix (PPM) policy for TB control in India. 
 
Policy Context: Public-Private Mix-Tuberculosis
Global and National Tuberculosis Burden
Worldwide, TB is the cause of millions of deaths annually, 
83% of which occur in three WHO regions: South East Asia, 
the Western Pacific, and the African Region.21 The WHO 
Global Tuberculosis Report for the year 2013, estimated that 
there were 8.6 million new cases of TB (13% living with HIV) 
and 1.9 million deaths from the disease in 2012 alone.21 India 
is ranked 17th out of the 22 countries with the highest burden 
of TB.22 In 2011, of the estimated 9 million global annual 
incidence of TB, 2.3 million occurred in India23 – one quarter 
(26%) of the global burden of TB.21 From 1961 to 1993, India 
implemented an integrated national TB programme (NTP). 
In 1993, the Government of India revised the NTP to include 
the WHO DOTS policy, and the programme was re-named 
the ‘RNTCP.’24,25 Since its inception in 1996, the programme 
has initiated the treatment of more than 12.8 million patients, 
and has saved nearly 2.3 million lives.26
Private Medical Sector and Tuberculosis Management 
In 1999-2000, the WHO undertook an assessment of the 
role of private healthcare providers in TB control all over the 
globe. The assessment revealed that in low-income countries 
a large proportion of TB suspects and cases accessed private 
healthcare services but these practitioners were often not 
associated or connected to the public health system.27 In 
India, the private medical sector plays a significant role in 
the management of TB.28 Secondly, there are reports that, in 
addition to the public sector, a huge private sector in Andhra 
Pradesh manages substantially high number of patients for 
TB.29 A survey in 2007 showed that 80% of the PPs had seen 
TB patients in Hyderabad and most of them were managing 
TB on own.30 Studies of patient management practices 
have highlighted inappropriate prescribing, inadequate 
counselling, and violations of clinical and ethical guidelines on 
patient care,31-34 as well as reported patient delays in accessing 
DOTS.35 These management practices affect patients’ 
adherence to treatment (due to their limited ability to afford 
treatment) and increase the development of drug resistance 
resulting from incomplete and inadequate treatment.36,37 
Despite the irrational and inequitable practices, PPs remain 
an important and the preferred providers of primary care 
for many people38 because of their accessibility in terms of 
distance and opening hours, their responsiveness to patients, 
their maintenance of privacy and confidentiality, and due to 
the general poor quality of the public sector services.39,40
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India’s Response to Public-Private Mix-Tuberculosis Policy
Linking TB control with the private sector has been an 
important policy development at WHO and in September 
2000, WHO created the PPM DOTS – PPM for DOTS 
expansion strategy.41 WHO defined PPM for TB control as 
‘strategies that link all healthcare entities within the private 
and public sectors (including health providers in other 
governmental ministries) to national TB programmes for 
expansion of DOTS activities.’42 
In response to the WHO’s PPM strategy, the RNTCP piloted 
and documented innovative PPM DOTS models.43 From 
2002, they expanded PPM DOTS activities nationwide using 
the policy guidelines for involvement of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs)44 and PPs45 under different schemes.46 
The Mahavir Project in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, was 
the first initiative to formally involve private providers in the 
RNTCP.47,48 This led the RNTCP to further recognize the need 
to partner with NGOs and private healthcare providers43 to 
create an integrated health system to control TB. Several PPM 
DOTS initiatives have demonstrated that involving PPs and 
NGOs can to help increase TB case detection.48-50
However, over the past decade the uptake of PPM-TB 
schemes, under a formal government agreement, has 
declined. In addition, the emergence of multi-drug resistant 
TB (MDR-TB) and HIV-TB co-infection has posed a huge 
challenge for effective TB programme implementation.16 As a 
result, there was a need to revise the existing PPM-TB policy 
schemes to meet the challenges of present day programme 
implementation. Since 2008, these revised schemes have been 
disseminated in all the States.51,52 
Role of Private Practitioners in Public-Private Mix-Tuberculosis 
Policy Implementation 
The PP can get involved in a single activity in the TB 
programme or in multiple activities depending on his or her 
capacity, interest and the requirements of the programme. 
To be a DOTS provider, PPs need to show willingness to 
place DOTS box for TB patients at his/her clinic. A box of 
medications for full course of treatment is reserved for every 
registered patient. The PPs are expected to ensure follow-
up sputum collection and late patient retrieval, as well as 
to maintain RNTCP records for the patients and to permit 
on-site monitoring by RNTCP supervisory staff as per 
RNTCP guidelines. In addition to being a DOT provider, 
PPs can refer those individuals they suspect of having TB for 
diagnosis and treatment, irrespective of whether the client 
is diagnosed as having TB at a private labs. DOTS providers 
receives an honorarium of Rs 250 per case (US$3.9) for each 
TB case treatment that is successfully completed, and in the 
case of MDR-TB, the amount increases to Rs 1000 per case 
(US$15.9).52
Contribution of Private Practitioners to Case Detection
In 2003, based on the results of the feasibility studies, the 
RNTCP launched an intensified PPM project in 14 urban areas 
in India. Additional human resources were provided to each 
of these sites in the form of an RNTCP medical consultant 
and two field workers.53 Medical consultants were reported to 
be useful in faster implementation of DOTS as compared to 
areas without consultants.54 In order to further mainstream 
the PPM-DOTS, additional human resources provided to 
these 14 sites had been withdrawn by January 2008,55 and 
attempts continue to be made to scale-up PPM-DOTS.51 
Although, the scale-up of PPM implemented in the 14 cities 
is claimed to be productive,56 a critical review of the RNTCP 
annual reports over the last seven years26,51,55,57-60 shows that 
the contribution by PPs to the referral of TB suspects in these 
14 sites has remained around only 4% (Figure).
Considering that 80% of India’s practicing doctors work in 
the private medical sector39 and that they alone manage 60% 
of the TB case load,28 the referrals from PPs under PPM-TB 
is minimal. One explanation may suggest that since patients’ 
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Figure.  (TB) Suspects Referred to RNTCP Microscopy Centres. 
Abbreviations: NGO, non-governmental organization; TB, tuberculosis; RNTCP, Revised National TB Control Programme.
The 14 sites are large urban areas in 14 different states: Bihar (Patna), Chandigarh, Gujarat (Ahmadabad), Jharkhand (Ranchi), Karnataka 
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Rajasthan (Jaipur), Tamil Nadu (Chennai), Uttar Pradesh (Lucknow), and West Bengal (Kolkata).
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first access PPs’ services, most patients in the DOTS enrolment 
would be de facto referrals from private providers,47 and 
perhaps the public health sector is failing to capture these 
informal referrals.61 Another perspective may involve a 
consideration of the extent that the widely advocated PPM 
strategy has been adapted to the needs of private providers and 
participating NGOs, and are these partnerships sustainable?62
Since 2007, the RNTCP has been working closely with the 
Indian Medical Association (IMA) to increase the number of 
PPs collaborating with the national programme.55 In addition, 
attempts to collaborate with AYUSH practitioners are being 
undertaken through the ‘Axshya’ India project.63 Despite these 
efforts, there is no substantial guidance on how to improve and 
sustain the PPM-TB policy through involvement of PPs. This 
paper attempts to address these identified gaps, by focusing 
on the individual practitioners; how they understand and 
think about the policy, how they feel about their involvement, 
and what challenges and constrains they identify within the 
policy guidelines. 
Methods
To understand the process of implementation of the PPM-
TB policy the study used a cross-sectional study design, 
with qualitative data collection and analysis within an 
ethnographic approach.64 The findings emerge from in-
depth interviews conducted with PPs, from participant 
observation in TB clinics, and from reflective process of field 
notes. Data collection was carried out between November 
2010 and December 2011 in a district, in a Southern State of 
India. To safeguard the anonymity and confidentiality of the 
respondents the study site will be left unnamed. 
The work was conducted in a TB unit (TU). Under the 
RNTCP, the study district has been divided into nine TUs 
each covering an approximate population of 0.5 million. 
Each TU consists of four to five designated microscopy 
centre’s (DMC’s) each covering a population of 0.1 million. 
In consultation with the District Programme Managers, one 
of the TUs was selected as an area for the detailed exploration 
of the PPM-TB policy implementation. The selection of PPs 
was restricted to the study TU. For this study, “PP” is defined 
as a physician who practices regularly in individual clinics for 
profit. A physician, though associated with the government 
may have separate practice in his/her individual private 
clinic, which is denoted by a visible display board. Such a 
physician also qualifies as a PP. Only those physicians who 
were consulted by adult outpatients and were practicing in a 
clinic with not more than two practicing practitioners were 
included in the study. 
A list of PPs participating in PPM-TB was obtained from 
the senior treatment supervisor (STS) and the laboratory 
technician (LT) of one of the DMCs. PPs linked with the 
programme were approached along with the programme staff 
to seek appointments for interviews. PPs not included in the 
list of the TU were approached through a friend who worked 
as marketing executive of the corporate hospital functioning 
in the TU area. His personal contacts with a majority of 
practitioners helped when seeking appointments with PPs 
not linked with the TB programme. In either case, those 
willing to participate in the study were included in the study 
sample. No distinction was made in selecting the PPs based 
on their system of medical practice, gender, or age. Interviews 
were conducted till data saturation was achieved. A total of 
21 in-depth interviews were held with PPs. On average each 
interview lasted between 45 minutes to 1 hour. 
The interview guide focused on understanding of PPM-
TB policy from the respondents’ perspective and how they 
experienced its implementation at subdistrict level. In 
addition to in-depth interviews, observations were conducted 
at field sites. Field notes were maintained to bring out the ‘rich 
context’ of the data collected.65
All interviews were conducted in English. All PPs showed their 
willingness to record their interviews, except one, wherein 
detailed notes of the interviews were taken. All interviews 
were preceded by informed verbal/written consent and all 
recorded interviews were transcribed word to word using 
NVivo07 software (QSR International Pty Ltd, Australia). 
Data coding was done using thematic analysis66 and then 
constantly compared67 with data from participant observation 
and notes from field diaries. Themes were identified using a 
manual method by back and forth reading of data, without 
using any computer program. It looked for commonalties, 
meanings and patterns within the interview transcripts and 
field notes. These commonalities were then coded, paragraph 
by paragraph.
This study draws on ethnographic fieldwork, and provides an 
in-depth exploration of PPM for TB control at the selected 
field site. This comprehensive understanding in-situ, based 
on empirical findings, cannot be generalized to the entire 
Indian setting. However, the findings demonstrate the 
possible processes and factors affecting relationships at the 
local level, and further provide deeper insights in explaining 
those factors.
Results 
The result section has been divided into three broad sections: 
Profile of PPs, PPs perceptions about their role in PPM-TB, 
and PPs perceptions towards DOTS.
Profile of Private Practitioners
A total of 21 PPs were interviewed (Table). Of the interviewed 
PPs, 13 were qualified allopaths (trained in Western 
medicine), two of whom were chest specialists. Four of the 
remaining eight PPs had a degree in Ayurvedic medicine 
and three were trained in the Unani medical system. Since 
the Unani system has declined over time, all three were 
only practicing allopathic medicines, whereas those trained 
in Ayurveda were engaged in ‘mixed practice.’ The term 
‘mixed practice’ here denotes Ayurvedic physicians engaged 
in prescribing allopathic medicines. Only five out of 13 
allopathic practitioners reported of being a member of IMA. 
PPs were practicing in small individual clinics, usually a 
small room divided into consulting room and waiting hall, 
with wooden partition or curtains. However, four of the 
PPs had bigger hospital set-ups. Many of these PPs were 
well-established, and had more than 20 years of experience 
(ranging from 7 to 30 years) of clinical practice. Two of the 
chest physicians, and two of the allopathic doctors (MBBS 
MD) were associated with the public sector as well. Their 
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clinics operated only in the evening hours, whereas the 
remaining PPs practiced in both the morning as well as the 
evening. On average, PPs saw a minimum of 20 clients per 
day (ranging from 10 patients to 100 patients). So far as TB 
cases were concerned, they not only depended on the client 
load but also on the location of practice – slum or non-slum. 
To give an example: An Ayurvedic practitioner has been 
practicing in a slum area for the last 20 years. On average 
he saw 40 general patients per day and, he saw ‘monthly two 
fresh TB patients’ [New cases]. In contrast, a senior allopathic 
practitioner who had practiced in a non-slum locality for 31 
years, has a turnover of 200 cases per day, 5% of whom were 
suspected of having TB. In all, 19 PPs reported referring their 
TB suspects to the DMCs: 12 were currently acting as DOTS 
providers; and two PPs reported that they had stopped being 
DOTS providers.
Private Practitioners Perceptions About Their Role in Public-
Private Mix-Tuberculosis
The PPs considered themselves to be more accessible and 
approachable to patients when compared to the government 
institutions. They perceived themselves to be important 
healthcare provider, and viewed themselves in different roles 
within the PPM-TB policy: ‘to guide patients in taking proper 
treatment’; ‘to promote their health’; ‘to save patients from 
disease specific and financial burdens’; ‘to show them the 
right direction.’ 
“...our ultimate goal is achieving good health for the 
patient…it makes me feel happy if a patient comes and says, 
“sir I got good results,” that is a good recommendation, a 
big remuneration, more than that what we can expect...” 
(Interview, Ayurvedic Practitioner).
Despite their perceived potential in managing TB patients, 
however, they felt neglected and undervalued in the 
implementation of PPM-TB policy, especially in terms 
of having flexibility to prescribe medicine, and providing 
supportive treatment to TB patients. 
“We Need Freedom to Prescribe…”
PPs expressed their opinions of the ‘little flexibility’ that 
RNTCP rendered to them in terms of their role in TB 
management, that not only decentralises the programme but 
also de-specialise the skills of PPs. 
“One cannot judge a clinician’s capacity to diagnose, he may 
not be taking an x-ray to rule out TB, taking an x-ray to 
rule out pneumonia, to rule out bronchitis, so in fact what 
happens is RNTCP or any public health programme is, it 
tries to decentralize and despecialise, so this was an act of 
despecialisation...” (Interview, Allopathic Practitioner). 
For instance, an allopathic practitioner, who has been 
practicing in the study area for a long time. The TU being 
nearer to his clinic, he referred most suspected TB cases to 
this centre. On most occasions, based on the x-ray results and 
his professional judgment, he was convinced that the cases 
he was referring were already TB positive and expected those 
cases to be put on treatment. However, on many occasions 
his professional judgments were overruled by the TB staff 
working at the centre. This perspective from the TB staff made 
him feel undervalued and, as a result, he stopped sending his 
cases to the centre. 
“…now when I send a case of two weeks cough, that means, I 
have already given this patient some treatment for two weeks 
and since it has not subsided I have referred him. Now what 
happens, when he goes there they send him back to us, saying 
that, ‘continue with this medicine for another two weeks.’ 
So that really puts me off and so I have stopped referring 
my cases to this DMC. So I think that is how we miss the 
patients” (Interview, Allopathic Practitioner).
In India, TB drugs are available across the counter without a 
prescription slip. Anyone can walk into a private pharmacy 
to buy TB drugs. PPs expressed their opinion that TB drugs 
should be made available in all pharmacies and that PPs and 
patients should have easy access to them. A senior physician 
who has long-term experience of managing TB patients in his 
own clinics within the private regimen asserted:
“…As a private doctor, I am not interested in 250/- Rs. 
What I need is the freedom to prescribe for my patients. 
If it is a bad prescription, then definitely the government 
should intervene. If the prescription is in line with the WHO 
guidelines the quality of the drugs has to be ensured by the 
system within the government, which is the drug controller. 
That is not the concern of somebody else or other agency or 
WHO…” (Interview, Allopathic Practitioner).
The policy document states that any patient who has had a 
cough for two weeks needs to be immediately referred to the 
DMC to rule out the possibility of TB. PPs, however, found it 
hard on many occasions to immediately refer patients to the 
programme. A practitioner mentioned that the ‘very first day 
I can’t ask any patient to go to the TB centre.’ PPs laid emphasis 
on the importance of provider-patient relationships stating 
that, a PP cannot ask any patient to go to the TB centre on 
the very first day, else they would become panic and lose their 
trust in PPs. 
“It is quite different here, without asking me these area 
people they don’t go to any other doctor … accidentally if 
they consult any other doctor the very next day they get 
their prescriptions and medicines to me and they continue 
it only after confirming with me…” (Interview, Allopathic 
Table. Profile of PPs
PP Types Number DOTS Providers Manage TB own Refer patients to DMC Refer Patient to Private Facility
MBBS 13 6 9 11 4
BAMS 4 4 1 4 2
BUMS 3 3 0 3 1
RMP 1 1 0 1 1
Total 21 14 10 19 8
Abbreviations: MBBS, bachelor of medicine, bachelor of surgery; BAMS, bachelor of Ayurveda medicine and surgery; BUMS, bachelor of Unani medicine and 
surgery; RMP, registered medical practitioners; PP, private practitioner; TB, tuberculosis; DMC, designated microscopy centre.
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Practitioner).
If there is a concern for allopathic practitioners about having 
the freedom to prescribe and manage their patients, then 
what is it like for the AYUSH practitioners?
“Our Role Should Go Beyond DOTS Provision…” 
In contrast to the MBBS doctors, those practicing AYUSH 
medicine welcomed the policy of PPM-TB for DOTS and 
showed willingness to be associated with the programme. 
However, they emphasised that their role should go beyond 
DOTS provision. They highlighted the gaps in the programme 
that have led to a failure to attract practitioners from AYUSH. 
They saw a weakness in the TB programme that neglects the 
side effects of treatment and has no proper management of 
side effects. From the first instance, PPs were aware of the side 
effects due to the intake of DOTS. They considered DOTS 
doses to be high, leading to severe side effects which most 
of the patients were unable to bear and compelled them to 
discontinue their treatment. A senior Ayurvedic practitioner 
mentioned a case who ultimately switched from the public to 
the private sector due to the side effects of DOTS.
“…after starting the DOTS treatment…the patient had 
severe gastro intestinal disturbances…so I referred the case 
back to the DMC…all of a sudden at mid-night the patient 
developed severe breathlessness, heart burn and vomiting…
so the family shifted the patient to the private hospital…the 
patient consulted a MD physician in the same hospital…I 
think he started some other anti-TB treatment…” (Interview, 
Ayurvedic Practitioner).
AYUSH PPs found that irrespective of the side effects, the 
programme had limited capacity to deal with them. In contrast, 
PPs, mostly participating as DOTS providers were efficient in 
giving side effect treatment to their clients. A senior AYUSH 
practitioner, who has been associated with the programme 
for many years, shared his experience of prescribing side 
treatment to his patients. He mentioned prescribing Liv-52 
to all his patients on DOTS regimen as well as those patients 
taking his own private TB treatment. Liv-52 is an Ayurveda 
medicine to strengthen the liver and improve its function.
“…already TB drugs act on the liver. If the liver is healthy 
then everything is healthy…that’s why we are giving every 
patient Liv-52 DS…and the results are good. It is very cheap, 
30/- Rs per month. So if government people provide Liv-52 or 
any B complex and protein it will help the patient because he 
is already anaemic…” (Interview, Ayurvedic Practitioner).
This practitioner also compared those patients on DOTS 
in the public sector with those taking DOTS at his clinic. 
He asserted that those taking DOTS at his clinic along with 
supportive treatment were much healthier than those taking 
DOTS without supportive treatment. PPs felt that, irrespective 
of the important role they can play in managing TB side 
effects, the public sector’s approach of ‘this is the DOTS box, 
keep it in your clinic,’ not only undermines their expertise but 
also prevents them from increasing their involvement in the 
programme. 
“What Happened? You Are not Sending Cases…”
Mostly MBBS and AYUSH PPs were not very influenced by 
the financial incentives, and incentives were perceived to be 
secondary as compared to the benefit their patient would 
receive from the TB programme in seeking good health. In 
comparison with the Allopathic and AYUSH practitioners, 
motivational factor was quite different for ‘unqualified 
practitioners.’ They considered their association with the 
programme to be valuable as they got more patients and 
their relationships with them developed long-term, making 
these patients their regular clients after completion of their 
TB treatment. Although they said that financial incentives 
were secondary for them, field observations showed that 
financial incentives was the crucial factor in motivating 
unqualified practitioners to be involved when compared to 
those individuals with qualifications. 
 “I accompanied the STS to the field. In addition to the regular 
follow up of clients with the PPs, he had an additional task 
of handing over the honorarium cheques to the PPs. When 
we entered a g practitioner’s clinic, he looked a bit tired. 
There was space to sit and due to insufficient light in his 
clinic everything appeared dull and dark. He asked the STS 
‘what happened? Why are you not sending cases?’ I was a bit 
confused, why was he asking such a question when he himself 
is supposed to refer the cases to the DMC and not vice-versa? 
However, later I realised that he meant DOTS patients. For 
every DOTS patient he was getting Rs. 250 ($US4). The STS 
right then handed him a cheque for Rs. 1750 ($US28.3) for 
the seven cases for whom he had provided DOTS in the last 
year” (Excerpt from Field Diary, Thursday, May 26, 2011).
This also shows that unqualified PPs were willing to work as 
DOTS providers and encouraged staff to send more DOTS 
patients, considering the financial benefits behind it. 
Private Practitioners Perceptions Towards DOTS
In the previous section, we came across factors that dissuaded 
the PPs from getting fully involved in implementation of 
PPM-TB. In this section, we will highlight that in addition to 
those factors, the PPs had contrasting perceptions about the 
different components of TB programme that demonstrated 
public sectors dominance in overall implementation of DOTS 
strategy. 
“Tuberculosis Programme Is Public Sector Driven…” 
The entire process of involving a PP in the TB programme 
under the PPM-TB policy was considered to be ‘public 
sector-driven’ by most of the practitioners; the diagnosis was 
with the public sector and the medicine was with the public 
sector. PPs were viewed simply as referral points to gain cases. 
Irrespective of the contribution PPs made, the credit was 
always considered to be taken by the government. 
“…‘If you give cases to PPs, our credit will disappear’…
means RNTCP doesn’t want to give their cases to PPs for 
management because then, how will they take the credit for 
the programme?” (Interview, IMA Representative).
PPs assertion that ‘TB programme is public sector driven…’ was 
overall based on the following components. 
i. Intermittent Verses Daily DOTS
The RNTCP recommends standardised alternate day DOTS 
to all patients. However, the private sector never favoured the 
standardised alternate day DOTS regimens over case-specific 
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daily doses. The RNTCP has stood out as going against the 
traditional pattern of medicine prescription in India and TB 
is the ‘only communicable disease with intermittent therapy.’ 
A senior chest physician who is associated with the public 
sector, but also has his own private practice, expressed his 
opinion as follows: 
“…See, if you are a diseased man treatment will be a 
continuous. Take a tablet three times daily that is by 
convention and tradition. It is there, it is the belief, and both 
the providers and patients are used to that belief, so when 
you try to engage the private sector, private behaviour of 
prescribing and patient behaviour of taking medicines need 
to be considered…” (Interview, Senior Chest Physician). 
In addition to ‘patient behaviour of taking medicines,’ another 
reason that was flagged by most of the PPs was the ‘pill load.’ 
PPs asserted that daily DOTS, as compared to alternate DOTS 
would cause less harm to the patients. 
“See this formation of DOTS schedule is absolutely wrong, 
one day you give high dose that is the peak level of drug, 
means you give double dose but the next day you give 
nothing. In daily regimen you give balanced drug every 
day that means you reduce the scope for resistance of the 
bacteria…it’s not very high one day and nothing the other…” 
(Interview, Allopathic Practitioner).
ii. “Observation” of DOTS Is Difficult
The WHO initiated DOTS policy recommends that the 
swallowing of all doses of TB drugs by the patient should 
be supervised either by a frontline health worker or by a 
community or family member, work colleague or private 
provider nominated by the patient and the health provider. 
PPs felt that the RNTCP claimed to have a strong monitoring 
component in place and that PPs were often criticised by 
programme and staff members for not having a proper 
monitoring system in place to observe their own TB patient 
treatment. PPs, however, questioned the feasibility of DOTS. 
Even those PPs who had DOTS box in their clinics failed to 
observe their DOTS patients swallowing the TB medicine 
in front of them. A senior doctor who was associated with 
the public sector and also had his own private clinic running 
in the late evenings for almost 25 years, referred his cases 
regularly to the nearest DMC and mentioned that he had good 
cooperation from the staff at the DMC located near his clinic. 
However, he said that observing DOTS was only a constraint. 
“…The only constraint is observing the DOTS…a good 
number of people [patients] are sitting in a small room, so 
it is very difficult to observe the DOTS…That is the only 
constraint that I have faced in my clinic…” (Interview, 
Allopathic Practitioner).
Field observations at various DOTS centres revealed that all 
private clinics had an attendant, usually a non-medical person 
who helped the practitioner in the day to day functioning of 
the clinic. The PP rarely came into contact with the patient who 
visited the clinic to take his DOTS strip of medication. The 
patient directly got in touch with the attendant who handed 
over the strips, rarely bringing the observation component 
into practice. Furthermore, observations at the DMCs were 
not different from those occurring at the private clinics. Due 
to a high patient turnover, the health staff at the DMC failed 
to observe the patients swallowing their medicines, only the 
first one or two doses were observed; whereas the remaining 
occasions the drugs were simply handed over to the client. 
“…Multi-purpose health supervisor (MPHS) was on leave 
today, so I thought of helping the LT in distributing the DOTS 
strip. Later in the afternoon, a lady came and asked for her 
DOTS strip for phase one. I pulled out a strip and handed it 
over to her, she replied, ‘it’s only one strip, I need two more.’ 
I said, you need to swallow this and come back the day after 
tomorrow. She was a bit upset over this and said to me, ‘Are 
you a new sir? The other sir [MPHS] always gives me three 
strips.’ I looked at the LT and he just nodded his head; that 
meant, I should give her two more strips…” [Excerpt from 
Field Diary, Tuesday, May 31, 2011].
iii. No Chest Physicians at Tuberculosis Centres 
A further gap identified by physicians was the program’s undue 
attention to the disease rather than to the patient as a whole. 
They considered that a TB patient needs attention from a 
holistic perspective and each case needed to be understood in 
relation to his body function. PPs linked TB management and 
chest physicians (CPs) together, and shared their experience of 
referring their clients to private CPs. A very senior Ayurvedic 
practitioner highlighted the importance of having proper CPs 
in the programme who can manage the TB cases holistically. 
“…A chest physician looks after a TB patient from all angles. 
He gives TB drugs but also monitors and caters to his side 
effects simultaneously. This is the loop hole in the RNTCP…” 
(Interview, Ayurvedic Practitioner).
PPs observed that most of the CPs who had private clinics were 
either full-time professors at government teaching colleges/
hospitals or retired professors. PPs felt that such CPs who had 
long-term experience of dealing with chest diseases needed to 
be hired by the programme, or the programme should request 
them to volunteer their services. PPs felt that in the absence 
of CPs, there was an over reliance on the frontline staff who 
themselves decided who to start on treatment. In the absence 
of proper CPs, and to avoid the conflicts with TB staff, PPs 
had developed a link with nearby private CPs for their private 
patients. 
“See, our aim is to give better treatment to the patient...
because in DMCs they don’t have chest physicians...So in that 
case whenever you need a chest physician, it’s better to advise 
a patient to see a chest physician…sometimes I advise them 
to go to a private chest physician…” (Interview, Ayurvedic 
Practitioner).
Interestingly, interactions with three CPs (who were also 
government employees) revealed that in their private clinics 
they were the least supportive of the DOTS strategy and were 
more in favour of prescribing their own treatment to the 
clients. 
“...See the pill load in DOTS; there are seven tablets. The 
patient has to take it thrice a week. Daily treatment will 
reduce the pill load; taking few tablets at one time will reduce 
the side effects...” (Interview, Senior Chest Physician). 
iv. More Concentration on Pulmonary Tuberculosis
PPs considered it as ‘a loop hole in the programme,’ wherein 
the programme failed to treat extra pulmonary, TB cases. 
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PPs felt that, on the one hand the programme advocates for 
referral from them, but on the other hand when referred, and 
if a case turns out to be extra pulmonary, then it is given less 
attention. 
“…Depending on sputum examination…I don’t think, 
because there are many cases of extra pulmonary tuberculosis 
[EP-TB] also. Now they don’t care for EP-TB…for EP also 
they will ask for sputum examinations If lymphadenitis 
[Inflammation of a lymph node] is there or if patient is with 
Cox Spine [Spine TB], they don’t give. Government people, 
they don’t give [treatment], unless and until they are told 
from chest hospitals…” (Interview, Allopathic Practitioner).
Such instances made PPs strongly assert that the TB 
programme was highly government-driven, making PPs 
feel isolated, not only at the field level but also at the level 
of policy decisions and planning. As a result, although PPs 
felt responsible towards TB patients by participating in PPM-
DOTS, they found it difficult to perceive themselves as a 
‘partner to the programme.’
Discussion 
This study explored the national PPM policy for TB control 
in India by focusing on the perceptions and experiences of 
the PPs engaged in implementing DOTS programme at the 
subdistrict level. The main focus was not on assessing policy 
outcomes in terms of successes or failures, but to understand 
the concerns of PPs, the challenges they face, and the 
implication of these findings on their continued involvement 
with the programme. A strength of this study lies in the 
insights it provides through in-depth interactions with PPs, 
and also through the daily observations made in the field. The 
study does not look into the day to day management of TB 
patients by the PPs in their clinics. 
The results highlight the constraints that individual PP’s face 
which affect their relationships with the programme and 
with other practitioners. Although DOTS was agreed to in 
principle, in practice PPs held a negative attitude towards 
the policy. Similar responses from private stakeholders 
have been documented by Atun et al68 in their study on 
DOTS implementation in Russia. The idea of referring those 
suspected of having TB to government health facilities, has 
challenged the traditional medical role of PPs, giving them 
less freedom to diagnose or to decide on appropriate referrals. 
In the RNTCP, an algorithm is followed for the diagnosis 
of  TB cases.69 If the suspect shows sputum negative results 
during the first screening, then they receive symptomatic 
treatment and broad spectrum antibiotics for 10-14 days. 
If the symptoms persist for 15 days, a repeat sputum 
investigation is performed and, if necessary, a chest x-ray. 
Medical practitioners have the authority to make treatment 
decisions based on their individual professional judgement 
and expertise. While evaluating Starr’s70 analysis of the impact 
on medicine of healthcare, Halpern stated, ‘Starr maintains 
that medicine’s professional standing is rooted in its cultural 
authority, a form of legitimacy that enables physicians to 
make judgments of meaning and value and have these held to 
be true and valid.’71 The traditional Indian clinical approach 
to TB diagnosis under the NTP has been through the use of 
x-rays.24 In contrast to this, the RNTCPs WHO recommended 
DOTS strategy advocates to use sputum microscopy for 
TB diagnosis and for some PPs this has taken away their 
autonomy. The sputum smear microscopy is simple, rapid, 
inexpensive,72 and more ‘specific’ when compared to chest 
x-ray.73,74 However, the wide spread use of x-ray by PPs, and 
their ability to make clinical judgments cannot be ignored 
if their participation needs to be sustained. In recent years, 
development has occurred around rapid diagnosis for TB 
using techniques such as the Gene Xpert MTB/RIF. Although 
its availability among private labs is increasing,75 there is still 
a dearth of information around its use and preference among 
PPs. 
In contrast to a daily regimen, the DOTS strategy advocates 
standardised alternate day TB drugs to all patients. In the 
field of PPM-TB, where PPs are invited to be a partner, the 
RNTCP has constantly advocated for this new DOTS strategy. 
This has led to extensive debate, and the private sector has 
been consistent in criticising standardised alternate treatment 
regimes, as compared to case-specific tailored daily doses.76 As 
mentioned by one of the CP in this study: ‘…private behaviour 
of prescribing and patient behaviour of taking medicines need 
to be considered….’ This belief might be considered to be 
‘common sense’ or even an ultimate truth for most medical 
practitioners and individuals in the society. It also emphasises 
the need for considering the health beliefs and social norms of 
the community if the health systems is going to be efficient.77 
The policy’s lack of flexibility in allowing PPs to prescribe TB 
treatment on their own, or using their own system of medicine 
as a supportive treatment (in the case of AYUSH PPs), can be 
seen as a process of undervaluing their educational capability 
as well as their professional skills. Similar experiences of PPs 
feeling undervalued and demotivated in the TB programme 
have been reported in other studies conducted in India and 
elsewhere.68,78
None of the public sector associated CPs supported 
‘observation’ of DOTS in their private practices. PPs asserted 
that the policy-makers and national programme managers 
have ignored the challenges faced by implementers in 
‘observing’ DOTS, and have continued to push the component 
of ‘observation.’ A Cochrane review has shown that patients 
observed while taking their TB drugs did not improve the cure 
rate compared with patients without direct observation of 
treatment.79 The hard and fast rule or ‘dogma’ of ‘observation’ 
also reflects the programme’s mistrust of patients, and makes 
the whole aspect of ‘observation’ more technical, thus, missing 
out on the importance of the human aspects of relationship. 
In addition, the priority within DOTS is given to the most 
infectious cases, ie, the smear positive cases and often, the 
smear negative cases are taken less seriously. This means that 
extra pulmonary TB cases get little attention and are often 
neglected.80 
There was a serious resistance from PPs over the lack of 
CPs within the TB programme. Interestingly, in the absence 
of CPs at the TB centres, PPs had developed a link for their 
patients with nearby private CPs. A recent study conducted 
in Maharashtra has shown that most of the private CPs 
were generally complying with the current guidelines 
for management of drug resistance TB.81 This provides a 
further opportunity for TB programmes to involve CPs in 
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the diagnosis and treatment of TB patients, as well as an 
opportunity to strengthen the private-private relationships. 
An overemphasis on sputum, combined with the strong 
recommendation for the alternate day regimen for treatment 
has not only side-lined the use of x-ray and daily regimens, 
but in a deeper sense has interfered with the PPs’ perceived 
freedom and professional autonomy to diagnose and treat 
their TB patients. It appears not only to hinder the reach of 
the programme, but also makes it difficult for practitioners to 
participate and to contribute.
These challenges and constrains experienced by PPs also 
reflects the ‘inherent contradiction in the public health 
approach to the control of infectious diseases like TB.’82 In 
public health, populations gets prioritised over individuals.83 
Both the approaches are essential, and there needs to be a 
balance. One way of achieving it could be through the wider 
dissemination of International Standards for TB Care (ISTC) 
among PPs, and through allowing the PPs more freedom to 
prescribe different regimens that would be confined within 
the wider guidelines of the ISTC.84 The RNTCP–IMA led 
training programmes for allopathic practitioners have 
adopted the ISTC,85 however, it was surprising to note that 
not all allopathic practitioners were members of the IMA. 
These factors need to be considered when planning future 
dissemination/training programmes for practitioners. 
The PPM-TB policy has categorised all types of PPs under 
one broad group as ‘private providers.’ This single label has 
not only overlooked the hierarchy amongst practitioners,86 
but has also ignored the different perspectives and potential 
of each system of medicine and the contribution they can 
bring to TB control efforts. The PPs are often perceived as 
‘money-minded’ or ‘with a business-minded approach,’ and 
financial incentives are considered one of the best ways to 
involve them in any health programme.5 The current PPM-
TB policy document tends to see all practitioners through 
the same lens of financial incentives. In this study, however, 
the interactions with PPs revealed that their motivation was 
not purely incentive-based; rather there was a variation across 
types of providers in terms of their need for incentives. MBBS 
PPs were not very influenced by the financial incentives, 
and financial incentives were not the best means to enhance 
their involvement. Likewise, for those following the AYUSH 
system of medicine, financial incentives were secondary as 
compared to the benefit their patients would receive from the 
TB programme in seeking good health. Similar experiences 
are shared by Khan et al86 based on their experience and work 
with PPM initiatives in South Asia. 
One PPs assertion that, ‘TB programme is public sector driven…’ 
also reflects the overpowering authority of the public sector 
over the private sector. In their study of an NGO-Government 
partnership in India, Baru and Nundy87 reported that the 
public sector is the major player and defines the terms and 
conditions, whereas the private sector plays the minor role, 
and has to consent or negotiate terms and conditions. The 
DOTS strategy (alternate day drugs) was derived from the 
international TB policy and has been incorporated into the 
RNTCP without taking into consideration the local context – 
which in our study area demonstrated a large private medical 
sector with PPs that practices case-specific treatment and 
the use of tailored daily doses of medication. As a result, 
although the WHO’s stop TB strategy has been instrumental 
in bringing the PPM-TB partnership policy into the field at 
the local, it has not made a significant impact in building trust 
and relationships across the different sectors. 
Scholars investigating the policy transfer of DOTS have 
commented that the ‘top-down internationally driven 
policy changes may lead to apparent policy transfer, but not 
necessarily to successfully implemented programmes.’88 If the 
PPM-TB policy initiatives continue to remain top-down and 
become too technical in their implementation, then the policy 
will continue to widen the barriers of mistrust within the 
TB programme.89 This will also pose future threats to other 
partnership initiatives across the public and private sectors. 
If national policies are to be effective at the subdistrict level, 
then the TB programme needs to be flexible enough. The 
experiences of people implementing DOTS and their abilities 
to deal with the patients need to be recognised accordingly, 
and supported with appropriate strategies for ensuring the 
success of TB control efforts.
Nonetheless there is a hope for achieving sustainable 
partnerships with PPs, as the country moves towards 
achieving the objectives laid out in the WHO’s ‘post-2015 TB 
strategy.’18,22 In 2012, the Indian Government adopted a policy 
on ‘mandatory notification of TB cases’ that gives PPs the 
flexibility to have their TB patients tested at the DMC, but to 
manage treatment on their own, provided they register their 
TB cases.90 This policy is still in its preliminary stages and 
there is currently no evidence on how relationships between 
providers and the programme can be enhanced to strengthen 
the health systems. Additionally, since November 2013 the 
Department of AYUSH has been elevated as an independent 
ministry. One of its key functions is to generate awareness 
about the efficacy of the AYUSH system domestically and 
internationally. Although there are initiatives within the TB 
programme to involve AYUSH practitioners, their potential 
needs to be further explored and expounded. 
Conclusion 
Strong health systems are a prerequisite to improve health 
outcomes and to accelerate progress towards achieving the 
national target of elimination of TB by 2020. Any strategy 
employed towards strengthening health systems in India, 
however evidenced based, may fail if the concerns and 
needs of the PPs continue to be ignored within the policy 
framework. Understanding the professional level of individual 
practitioners is crucial and needs to be supported with an 
appropriate incentive structures in order for their long-term 
involvement in the programme to be ensured. The untapped 
potential of different medical systems needs to be recognised, 
trusted and supported with the creation of suitable policy 
measures in the ‘post-2015 TB strategy.’ 
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